Great books!

Posted on March 7, 2014 by backyardbooks

Arthur Geisert – Ice and The Giant Seed:

The Chicken Thief (and its accompanying texts), by Béatrice Rodriguez

Posted in What is quality literature? | Tagged Children's Literature, stories without words | Leave a comment
The trouble with bread
Posted on February 22, 2014 by backyardbooks

I finally found this article again!


Posted in education around food and meals | Tagged bread making, bread science, coeliac disease, gluten, gluten allergy, gluten intolerance | Leave a comment

Little ninjas learn safe play
Posted on February 9, 2014 by backyardbooks

I couldn’t agree more!

There’s an article in today’s Herald online that presents the results of a Massey study into children’s physical education. It states: “Training babies to become shoulder-rolling “little ninjas” could reduce the rate of children seriously injuring themselves in homes and playgrounds, new research suggests.

The findings of a government-funded study have prompted calls for subsidised courses that use challenging play equipment to teach infants vital balance, safety and motor development skills before they can even walk.”

They learn to roll really easily too – hopefully not with their heads first!!! I don’t know why people teach that – much safer to roll shoulder to hip and keep the neck and head our of it (just watch the stunt men if you don’t know what I mean).


Posted in early years education | Tagged early childhood, Early learning, Early Years Education, risk, Risky environments, Safety and childhood | Leave a comment

Metaphors in Musical Motion
Posted on February 5, 2014 by backyardbooks

Mark L Johnson and Steve Larson present a really interesting argument for the metaphoric basis to our understanding (and experience) of musical motion. They explain how our embodied knowledge of motion aids us to comprehend music in terms of motion. This understanding is framed in terms of two key metaphors (drawn from our metaphoric understanding of time).

They write: “…the logic of certain metaphors shapes our understanding of musical motion and constrains the inferences we make in reasoning about such motion. These metaphors define what moves, the way it can move, and where it moves to.” (p.63)

“To analyze our metaphorical concepts of tonal motion, we must first understand our concepts of time, all of which are profoundly metaphoric. We typically conceptualize the “passing” of time metaphorically—as motion through space. Morgan (1980) noted the inseparability of musical space and musical time, and Alperson (1980) noted that our experience of musical motion depends on “the familiar habit of regarding the properties of time as analogous to those of space” (p.409). Alperson cites Bergson’s claim that
we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another. (p. 409)

Recent research in cognitive linguistics has revealed the marvelously complicated internal structure of such Western metaphorical conceptions of time, and it explains how we reason about time based on these inescapable, yet mostly invisible, metaphors. What this research shows is that there are two basic spatialization metaphors for time, and, as we shall see, each has a relevant counterpart in our conception of musical time and motion.

Consider, first, how we are conceptualizing time when we speak of it as “flying,” “dragging,” and “rushing by us,” and when we say things like “Easter will soon be here” and “Christmas has long since passed.” Here we understand temporal change as a particular kind of motion through space. There is a spatial schema [-p.67] in which an observer is facing in a fixed direction (“facing the future”), is situated at “the present” (the “here and now”), and times are conceptualized as objects moving toward and then past the stationary observer. Elements and structures of this spatial schema are mapped onto our understanding of time to form the “MOVING TIMES” metaphor. …

Notice the tight internal logic of this metaphor. We imaginatively project fronts and backs onto moving objects, and we conceptualize moving objects as facing in the direction of their motion (e.g., the front of the bus “faces” in the direction of its typical forward motion). Via the mapping of times as moving objects, times thus face the observer toward which they are moving, as in “I can see the face of things to come. I can’t face the future. Let’s meet the future head-on.”

(p.66)

“The second major metaphorical system for time involves a different spatial schema, one in which the observer moves across a landscape and times are points or regions on that landscape.…” (p.67)

“The two vast metaphor systems, “MOVING TIMES” and “MOVING OBSERVER,” define most of our spatialization of time. Notice that they are figure-ground reversals of one another. In the “MOVING TIMES” metaphor, the times are the figure moving relative to the stationary observer (as ground), whereas in the “MOVING OBSERVER” metaphor, the observer is the figure moving relative to the time landscape (as ground). Although the logic of each of these two metaphors is different, they both are based on the fundamental conception of the passage of time as relative spatial motion. These two spatial metaphors for time both play a central role in our understanding of musical motion, to which we now turn.” (p.68)

“Our claim is that people have no robust way of conceptualizing musical motion without metaphor and that all reasoning about musical motion and musical space inherits the internal logic of such metaphors. If this claim is correct, and if the source domain for musical motion is motion in space, then the ways we learn about space and physical motion should be crucial to how we experience and think about musical motion. To see this, let us begin by considering three of the most important ways we experience and learn about motion:

(a) We see objects move. [-p.69]
(b) We move our bodies.
(c) We feel our bodies being moved by forces.

Notice that all of these fundamental and pervasive experiences of motion are, for the most part, nonconceptual and prereflective, and yet they give rise to a large body of knowledge that we have about motion. For example, we experience objects and we experience ourselves moving from one point to another along some path, and so we develop our sense of locomotion (movement from one place [locus] to another). We experience moving objects changing speed through the application of physical forces. We know, in an
immediate bodily way, what it feels like to be moved by something else and to move ourselves. It is this source-domain knowledge of physical motion that is carried over into the target domain (musical motion) via systematic metaphoric mappings. Our central claim is that these three basic experiences of physical motion give rise, via metaphor, to three of the chief ways we conceptualize musical motion. Moreover, because musical motion, like physical motion, occurs over time, our two different metaphorical conceptualizations of time (“MOVING TIMES” and “TIME’S LANDSCAPE”) are incorporated into the basic metaphors of musical motion. We examine each of these three types of experience of motion, along with the metaphors based on them.” (pp.68-69)

“…we have two different and incompatible ontologies underlying [the] two different metaphors [through which we make sense of musical motion]. To some people, this inescapable inconsistency among various metaphorical structurings of our basic concepts for musical motion will be taken as evidence that the metaphors cannot really be constitutive and must rather be nothing but figures of speech. On the contrary, we should begin by noting that what is true of musical motion is equally true of our incompatible conceptions of time and, generally, our inconsistent conceptions of a vast range of abstract concepts, including causation, morality, mind, self, love, ideas, thought, and knowledge. Our claim is that each of these different, and often inconsistent, metaphorical structurings of a concept gives us the different logics that we need to understand the richness and complexity of our experience. However strong our desire for a monolithic consistent ontology might be, the evidence does not support such a unified and simple view of human experience. The absence of any core literal concept of musical “events” should direct our attention to the ways we imaginatively conceive of the flow of our musical experience by means of multiple metaphors that provide the relevant logics of our various conceptions of musical motion and space. There is no more a single univocal notion of musical motion than there is of causation, and yet we have gotten along reasonably well by knowing when a specific metaphor for causation is appropriate within a specific context of inquiry. The fact of multiple inconsistent metaphors for a single concept also sheds light on the important question of cultural difference and variation. The grounding of metaphors in bodily experience suggests possible universal structures (of bodily perception and movement) for understanding music. However, because there are multiple metaphors available, and because there may be differing cultural interpretations of bodily experience, metaphor provides one important avenue for exploring cultural and historical variation in significantly different conceptions of musical experience that might arise around the world.” (p.80)

Ref: (italics in original; emphases in blue bold mine) Mark L Johnson and Steve Larson (2003) “Something in the Way She Moves” – Metaphors of Musical Motion. Metaphor and Symbol 18(2), 63-84

Abstract: “Our most fundamental concepts of musical motion and space, used by laypeople and music theorists alike, are defined by conceptual metaphors that are based on our experience of physical motion. We analyze the 3 most important metaphors of musical motion: the “MOVING MUSIC” metaphor, the “MUSICAL LANDSCAPE” metaphor, and the “MOVING FORCE” metaphor. We show how each metaphor is grounded in a particular basic experience of physical motion and physical forces and how the logic of physical motion shapes the logic of musical motion. We suggest that our conceptualization of, discourse about, and even our experience of musical motion depend on the logic of these 3 metaphors.”

Posted in Metaphors and Narratives around children and learners | Tagged Mark L Johnson, metaphor, metaphors, metaphors in education, musical metaphor, musical motion, Steve Larson | Leave a comment
“In Lakoff and Johnson's (1980, 1999) theory of metaphor, “[conceptual metaphor is a natural part of human thought... [and] which metaphors we have and what they mean depend on the nature of our bodies, our interactions in the physical environment, and our social and cultural practices” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 247). Such embodied view of conceptual metaphors has been supported by a large amount of evidence from linguistic expressions in different languages. Despite the fact that metaphors in language are ubiquitous, Murphy (1996, 1997) and Glucksberg (2001) remain skeptical about the psychological reality of conceptual metaphors. They argued that using linguistic metaphors does not necessarily mean people do think metaphorically. Conventional metaphors in particular may have already been lexicalized without requiring the use of cross-domain cognitive mappings when people use them. Different sources of evidence were then proposed to refute the criticisms of circularity and lexicalization, among which evidence from psychological and neurobiological research was found to show that people do use sensorimotor experiences to understand metaphorical language and abstract concepts (Gibbs 2006, 2008). That linguistic metaphors shape thoughts can also be substantiated by Boroditsky's (2000, 2001) priming experiments which found that since Mandarin speakers talk about time in terms of a vertical spatial orientation and English speakers do so in terms of a vertical spatial orientation and English speakers do so in terms of a horizontal spatial orientation, they also think differently about time. Not only did Mandarin speakers perform faster after vertical spatial primes than after horizontal spatial primes, but English speakers' performance was similar to that of Mandarin subjects after English subjects had been trained to use vertical metaphors. To the English subjects, the novel vertical metaphors influenced their conventional thought. Nonetheless, whether this new way of thinking about time will become the subjects' habitual conceptualization rests upon whether people repeatedly think about time vertically. In neuroscience, connections between the relevant sensorimotor areas of the brain and abstract conceptualization were also observed (Boroditsky 2000, 2001; Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Gallese and Lakoff 2005).

In gesture studies, “[e]xamination of real-time gestural production... is particularly useful in cases where the data are ethnographic rather than experimental; gesture is always there, and visibly present in the videotaped data” (Núñez and Sweetser 2006: 3). The specific manifestation of a metaphor in the use of the hands thus provides independent visible evidence of metaphorical thinking, and supports the embodied nature of this pervasive cognitive phenomenon in communication (Cienki 1998; Cienki and Muller 2008; Gibbs 2008).” (pp.437-438)

“Psycholinguistic studies of linguistic metaphors have already found that people's bodily experiences in action affect their performance in the imagination and understanding of metaphorical actions (Gibbs 2006)....” (p.454)


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Metaphor as a barometer of our personal and communal health

 Posted on February 2, 2014 by backyardbooks

“Figurative language is surely more than an intellectual extravagance. It is as much a fiber of our very being as each of the countless neurons contained in our big, beautiful brains. Most fortunately, however, comprehension of novel expression serves as a useful barometer of our personal and communal health as well.” (Krause, p.16)

Ref: Kenneth W Krause (2008) Mapping Metaphor: This is your brain on figurative language. The Humanist July-August, pp.13-16

Posted in Understanding literacy | Tagged children's use of metaphors, metaphor, metaphors, metaphors in education | Leave a comment
Defining language – theory of mind

Posted on February 1, 2014 by backyardbooks

“[L]anguage is a system of communication that enables one to understand, predict, and influence the action of others. Inherent in this definition is a concept of theory of mind: if communication is instinctual rather than having a purpose, then it should probably not be considered a language. If communication has a purpose, this assumes an awareness of other independent actors, whose actions can potentially be influenced…. [F]or communication to serve the needs of the listener as well as the needs of the speaker, the listener must be able to understand what the speaker is ‘really’ saying. It is not enough to understand the literal meaning of speech.” — R Grant Steen, (quoted Krause pp.13-14)

I read this quote and thought again of the link between autism and/or aspergers, and metaphor use – as well as the apparent focus on communication that predominates in studies of children’s use of metaphor.

Ref: Kenneth W Krause (2008) Mapping Metaphor: This is your brain on figurative language. The Humanist July-August, pp.13-16

Differently abled children and their use of metaphor

Posted on January 30, 2014 by backyardbooks

It’s a clunky term (‘differently abled’), but it best explains the situation here. The research I’ve found so far suggests that children with particular learning dis/abilities have unique relationships with metaphor (abilities/difficulties). I need to do more research, but that is interesting!

Gold and Faust studied brain function in young adults with Asperger Syndrome encountering novel metaphors. They explain: “Asperger Syndrome (AS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by social impairments, difficulties in communication, and a set of circumscribed interests and/or a rigid adherence to routines. Although there is no significant delay in language or cognitive development, people with AS often exhibit difficulties in comprehending specific linguistic forms, mainly nonliteral language (Gillberg and Gillberg 1989), such as metaphors, irony and indirect requests. Previous research indicates severe disabilities in processing figurative language in people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (e.g., Dennis et al. 2001; MacKay and Shaw 2004). However, this aspect of language comprehension in AS specifically has rarely been the subject of formal study.” (Gold and Faust p.800)

In their review of the research, Gold and Faust write: “Both cerebral hemispheres have access to word meanings. However, comprehension of semantic relations differs in the RH and LH. …The accumulated evidence from neurologically intact, split-brain, and brain-injured participants indicates that when a word is recognized by the LH only the most strongly related meanings are activated, whereas in the RH a broad set of meanings, including distant, unusual, nonsalient, subordinate and figurative meanings becomes available.” (Gold and Faust p.800-801)

“The idea of a RH dysfunction in persons with AS (e.g. Ellis et al. 1994) may account for their observed difficulties in metaphor comprehension. Indeed, studies show that AS participants perform poorly on metaphor comprehension tests, similarly to people with disabilities associated with the RH, such as NLD (Gunter et al. 2002). Their findings suggest that the persons with AS were not impaired in processing either literal language or written and pictorial well-known metaphors. However, this group was severely impaired on the unusual metaphors comprehension task. The specific difficulties in understanding unusual metaphoric expressions experienced by persons with AS is consistent with recent findings that suggest enhanced RH involvement in novel metaphor comprehension and
thus may reflect RH dysfunction in persons with AS. Recent behavioral..., imaging..., and TMS...studies show that the two hemispheres are differentially involved in the processing of conventional versus novel metaphors and that RH involvement in metaphor comprehension is much more pronounced for novel than for conventional metaphors.” (Gold and Faust p.800)

They found that: “[the findings of their study] confirm[ed] the main hypothesis, showing RH [right hemisphere of the brain] advantage for novel metaphor processing in the intact brain, and a lack of RH advantage for novel metaphor comprehension in persons with AS [Asperger's Syndrome]. These findings support the hypothesis that RH dysfunction may be the underlying neurolinguistic mechanism associated with difficulties in metaphor comprehension. Furthermore, the reduced RH involvement during NM comprehension may reflect a disruption of the pattern of inter-hemispheric coordination during language comprehension in persons with AS. Thus, the findings suggest that the difficulty in metaphor comprehension in AS persons may have a neurolinguistic, semantic basis, in addition to the well documented pragmatic deficits in these persons. Specifically, by testing the RH's semantic processing out of social or linguistic context, it is clearly demonstrated that the ability to understand two-word novel metaphoric expressions is deficient in AS. Moreover, the results demonstrate the well-known difficulty experienced by persons with AS to comprehend metaphors, even frequently used conventional metaphors.” (Gold and Faust p.808)

Of 'gifted' children, Deborah Fraser writes: “Creatively gifted children have an extraordinary facility with metaphor, using these expressions in ways that reveal advanced metalinguistic ability. In addition, the metaphors they create reflect a wealth of ability from profound emotional and spiritual dimensions to playful and humorous insights into the human condition.” (Fraser, p.180 – part of the abstract)

(NB Fraser doesn't actually clarify how she perceives giftedness in this article, so these statements may seem a little open-ended here, but you get the idea.)

“Gifted children have the capacity to understand and create unique and evocative metaphors which convey pithy insights to the human condition.” (p.184)

“The everyday, colloquial use of metaphor has sometimes led to common phrases that no longer cause intrigue, such as ‘he’s a star’ and ‘she’s a sweetie’ (although such colloquial use can cause confusion across cultures). Such well known metaphorical expressions become taken-for-granted aspects of language, devoid of novelty and surprise. Winner (1997) argues that language is the graveyard of old metaphors (like these), but also the birthplace of new ones. Some metaphors seem to resist erosion by time… and the birth of many new metaphors can revitalize language and human perception. Moreover, ‘a metaphor is often the only way of communicating precisely and efficiently what one means’ (Winner & Gardner, 1993, p.429).

Creatively gifted children with a strength in language have a special facility with metaphors, using them in ways that are highly novel and original. Metaphor can also be a vehicle through which they reveal and develop their advanced cognitive, social, and emotional skills. In addition, metaphor can enable such gifted children to reveal insights, personal issues and reflections on their worlds in relatively unthreatening ways.” (Fraser, p.180)

“The intellectual exercise of constructing metaphors is a cognitive process that enables people to explore ideas, develop insights and communicate complex concepts in ways that can be accessible to others. As Winner (1997) states, ‘metaphor’ is at the root of the creativity and openness of language’ (p.16). Metaphors can also assist the creator to grasp a difficult and seemingly elusive idea.” (Fraser, p.181)

“Salovey and Mayer (1990) state that emotional intelligence includes knowing one's emotions, managing feelings, recognizing emotions in others, and handling relationships. It
seems that metaphorical analyses of emotions of import in a child’s life can assist in the
development of these social and emotional skills.” (Fraser, p.183)

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Metaphor use by young children

I have been researching metaphor use by young children...

Annoyingly, much of the work on children’s use of metaphor seems to focus on their ability
to understand and make themselves understood in the adult world (rather than on their
own metaphor generation for the purposes of making sense of the world. Obviously, I think
this is a limiting (and perhaps adult-centered) view, but it’s a place to start. Here are some
of the ideas and statements I found interesting:

“The metaphors that younger children use are based on physical links, rather than
conceptual and psychological ones (Winner, 1982). As children become more expert in
reading and writing, and as they grow older, their use of spontaneous metaphor declines
(Wagner, Winner, Cicchetti, & Gardner, 1981; Winner et al., 1976). Production and
comprehension of metaphor may be related to the nature of conversation between
children and the teacher (or other adult). That is, children’s exploration and
understanding of metaphor are diminished by teachers and other adults (Gallas,
1994; Winner, 1982) who may look for specific meanings of metaphorical language.”
(p.96, Sandip Lee Anne Wilson, 2000/2001)

“Children as young as 5 and 6 can use concrete, functional metaphors, and even explain
their choices (Waggoner & Palermo, 1990). Comprehension of metaphor is related to the
context of the metaphorical statement and prior knowledge (Ortony, 1979), and to the
context of the research situation itself (Vosniadou et al., 1984).” (p.96, Sandip Lee Anne
Wilson, 2000/2001)

“Both Winner (1982) and Gallas (1994) found that teachers and other adults often
undermine children's verbal exploration of metaphor.” (p.98, Sandip Lee Anne Wilson, 2000/2001)

“Winner (1988), Palermo (1986), and Vosniadou et al. (1984) questioned the extent to which prior knowledge of psychological states described metaphorically affects metaphoric comprehension. A child's failure to interpret the metaphor 'the prison guard was a hard rock' (Winner et al., 1976) might indicate unfamiliarity with prison guards, or the quality of being called hard. Children may not understand metaphorical attributes of character in other contexts (Vosniadou et al., 1984). Pearson, Raphael, Tepaske, and Hyser (1981) discovered that children understood unfamiliar information better with the use of metaphor than they did familiar information, yet metaphor seemed to impede comprehension of familiar information. This finding suggests children use metaphorical language to understand the world and to build knowledge as much as they develop it as a result of their knowledge.” (p.99, Sandip Lee Anne Wilson, 2000/2001)

“Vosniadou et al. (1984) note, “In real life, children are not usually exposed to metaphors out of context” (p.1589). Empirical studies, out of context, might create problems as much for adults as they do for children. The belief that texts containing metaphors are more difficult to read than texts without them is not necessarily simply a matter of the presence of the metaphor. Where metaphors are forced, contrived, or out of context, text is less comprehensible, not because of the metaphors but because of a lack of coherence.” (p.99, Sandip Lee Anne Wilson, 2000/2001)

Jay A Seitz's (1997) study results “indicated that (a) constructive-object play, rather than symbolic play, facilitated the understanding of perceptual and taxonomic metaphor, suggesting differences in early styles of metaphorical usage; (b) despite previous findings, the study failed to replicate a relationship between operativity and metaphoric understanding; and (c) younger children did significantly better in the pictorial medium, suggesting a picture-superiority effect for more perceptible metaphorical relations (perceptual and physiognomic), whereas older children showed a word-superiority effect for more conceptual metaphors (psychological-physical and taxonomic).” (from the abstract) I had a few problems with the methodology of Seitz's study: it didn't seem to be entirely appropriate for the 4 year old age group it worked with and included 'tasks' set by the researcher that were intended to assess 'child-initiated' symbolic play. (The child was told to go on a picnic, for example). Strange.

In any case, Seitz writes that “there is not an overall portrait of how various metaphoric content emerges in the preschool years and what may be important developmental antecedents” and intends this study to contribute to this gap. (I'm not sure it does, but the gap is still an interesting one and I agree with the notion of exploring it further.) Seitz also explains that “Theoretical claims for the close correspondence between play and metaphoric behaviors have been made in the literature, particularly from the naturalistic observation of symbolic play in young children (Winner, 1979; Winner, McCarthy, Kleinman, & Gardner, 1979). However, there is little empirical evidence to substantiate such claims. The prevailing view is that play “seems to develop a more generalized attitude and/or scheme which predisposes the individual to creating and using novelty” (Vandenberg, 1980). Symbolic play should display some “family resemblance” to metaphorical comprehension and production because both could be argued to possess an underlying similarity common to systems of nonostensive reference, in which a signifier stands in place of a signified. According to Ricoeur (1978), in the act of understanding a metaphorical relation between two things, a dual system of reference is involved between literal similarity (the “world” of reality) and nonliteral similarity (the “world” of the metaphor). Metaphor, like pretend play, involves suspension of reference to the everyday world—hence, the referent (e.g., an imaginary horse) is termed nonostensive, making possible a new creative reference, a “remaking of reality.”” (Seitz 1997)

“Even though the development of linguistic ability is undoubtedly a central achievement of childhood, Gombrich (1982) has emphasized the primacy of the visual image in
experience. For example, in Gombrich’s account, the use of the color blue to denote bodies of water on a map is an instance of a “natural metaphor.” Perceptual and physiognomic metaphors presented in pictures are easily understood by young children because they draw on natural relationships in the world that are largely a product of biological constraints. As children begin to evolve systems of verbal elaboration and to acquire cultural knowledge, including domain-specific knowledge of language and other conventional symbol systems, they become important media of expression and comprehension.” (Seitz 1997)

“Shotwell, Wolf, and Gardner’s (1980) research suggested that constructive-object play produced a relatively high incidence of metaphoric behaviors, principally perceptual and enactive metaphors, for a group of very young children they designated as “patterners.” Symbolic play tended to produce a relatively low incidence of metaphoric behaviors for a group of children they designated as “dramatists.” These findings suggest the early evolution of children’s preferences for modes of engagement with different kinds of materials.” (Seitz 1997) Interesting!

Chesley, Gillett and Wagner (2008) consider the use of verbal and nonverbal metaphor with children in counseling. Again, the focus is on understanding and being understood more than metaphor generation for the purposes of making sense of the world, but their article does touch on this aspect of children’s metaphor. They write: “Although children who have reached a certain developmental level may be able to understand metaphors, those with limited language skills are unlikely to express themselves using verbal metaphors. Young children, however, routinely use nonverbal forms of communication to express themselves. One example is children's play, which can serve functions that are similar to adults’ use of verbal metaphor in which one event is linked to another in a nonliteral way (Evans, 1988). In this article, we propose that the traditional definition of metaphor as a form of verbal communication can be expanded to include nonverbal forms of expression. This is especially relevant for children, who express internal thoughts and emotions through play with or without the accompanying verbal discourse (Bowman, 1995).” (Chesley, Gillett & Wagner, p.399)

“Drucker (1994) used the term ‘metaphoric competence’ (p.79) to describe a client’s ability to create metaphors.” (Chesley, Gillett & Wagner, p.406)

I like that these authors assert “Researchers must… explore the meaning of children's metaphors.” (Chesley, Gillett & Wagner, p.408) They also note that “Research on children's narratives also represents another important area for investigation.” (p.409) I think their focus here is a counseling one, but their assertions could be interpreted more generally with regard to all children’s use of metaphor (a focus that might then feed back into a counseling perspective).

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NB any emphases in blue bold are mine.


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Neuroscience, ECE and play

In a Guest Editorial to the *Early Childhood Education Journal*, Stephen Rushton “examines neuroscience and its impact on the field of education. [He] intertwines research with basic principles of learning…. The four principles are: (1) the brain is uniquely organized; (2) the brain is continually growing; (3) a ‘brain-compatible’ classroom enables connection of learning to positive emotions; and (4) children’s brains need to be immersed in real-life, hands-on, and meaningful learning experiences.” (abstract)

He writes: “As teachers, we make hundreds of decisions daily. Knowing when to step in, take over, wait, model, and lead is a balancing act that requires much skill. How much freedom do we give? When do we intervene in the course of a child’s learning? And now standardized testing has made its way down to 1st-grade classrooms. As a result, Kindergarten classes become the training grounds for success in 1st grade, and not necessarily a place where children can explore, grow, and learn at their own pace. What is our role as educators in this new world of standardized education?” (p.90)

“Clearly, times changed when the industrial age shifted to the information era. Our way of thinking and the neuro-pathways of our young are also changing. It has become clear that educators need not [-p.91] only to help children to do well in school but also – and more importantly – to help children survive in a world we ourselves cannot truly comprehend, see, or even imagine. It is our task as early childhood educators to help today's children learn to analyze, synthesize, and clarify information, not simply recite facts and figures from the past.” (p.91)

“…the use of play as a form of learning, when left open-ended, is congruent with individual differences. Each brain’s structure is designed to process information uniquely…. Playful learning allows for individual differences and mastery to occur.” (p.91)

“In 2007, Pat Wolfe, an educational consultant and expert on brain research, suggested that the bridge between the field of neuroscience research and education is not the job of neuroscientists, but instead, that of educators.” (p.91)

“Educators are aware of the changes that take place in children from day to day, month to month. Many of these changes are biologically driven and unique from child to child. Our job is to notice, accept, and modify the curriculum to each student.” (p.92)

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Great books are written publications that have been accepted by modern day scholars as the essential foundation of literature in Western culture. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines them as certain classics of literature, philosophy, history, and science that are believed to contain the basic ideas of western culture. Over the years it has become customary for institutes of higher education to incorporate these readings into their curriculum. The reason for the study of these classical texts is to The Great Books Tutorial has been designed to develop Christian minds that will understand and discern the influences that have shaped our culture. Western history is a tremendously rich saga. Studying the great books gives us the opportunity to see first hand the ideas that have directed our cultural history. The reading of the great books culminates a good classical education as it requires all the skills that classical education aims to develop in a child.